Methods, for providing data from network secure communications in a cluster computing environment

ABSTRACT

Secure communications are provided over a network in a distributed workload environment having target hosts which are accessed through a distribution processor by a common network address. Secure communications are provided by routing both inbound and outbound communications with target hosts which are associated with a secure network communication through the distribution processor. Both inbound and outbound secure network communications are processed at the distribution processor so as to provide network security processing of communications from the target host and network security processing of communications to the target host.

RELATED APPLICATIONS

The present application is related to commonly assigned and concurrentlyfiled U.S. patent application Ser. No. 09/764,500, now U.S. Pat. No.6,941,366, entitled “METHODS, SYSTEMS AND COMPUTER PROGRAM PRODUCTS FORTRANSFERRING SECURITY PROCESSING BETWEEN PROCESSORS IN A CLUSTERCOMPUTING ENVIRONMENT” and U.S. patent application Ser. No. 09/764,790,now U.S. Pat. No. 7,146,432, entitled “METHODS, SYSTEMS AND COMPUTERPROGRAM PRODUCTS FOR PROVIDING FAILURE RECOVERY OF NETWORK SECURECOMMUNICATIONS IN A CLUSTER COMPUTING ENVIRONMENT” the disclosures ofwhich are incorporated by reference as if set forth fully herein.

FIELD OF THE INVENTION

The present invention relates to network communications and moreparticularly to network communications to a cluster of data processingsystems.

BACKGROUND OF THE INVENTION

The Internet Protocol (IP) is a connectionless protocol. IP packets arerouted from an originator through a network of routers to thedestination. All physical adapter devices in such a network, includingthose for client and server hosts, are identified by an IP Address whichis unique within the network. One valuable feature of IP is that afailure of an intermediate router node or adapter will not prevent apacket from moving from source to destination, as long as there is analternate path through the network.

In Transmission Control Protocol/Internet Protocol (TCP/IP), TCP sets upa connection between two endpoints, identified by the respective IPaddresses and a port number on each. Unlike failures of an adapter in anintermediate node, if one of the endpoint adapters (or the link leadingto it) fails, all connections through that adapter fail, and must bereestablished. If the failure is on a client workstation host, only therelatively few client connections are disrupted, and usually only oneperson is inconvenienced. However, an adapter failure on a server meansthat hundreds or thousands of connections may be disrupted. On aSystem/390 with large capacity, the number may run to tens of thousands.

To alleviate this situation, International Business Machines Corporationintroduced the concept of a Virtual IP Address, or VIPA, on its TCP/IPfor 0S/390 V2R5 (and added to V2R4 as well). Examples of VIPAs and theiruser may be found in U.S. Pat. Nos. 5,917,997, 5,923,854, 5,935,215 and5,951,650. A VIPA is configured the same as a normal IP address for aphysical adapter, except that it is not associated with any particulardevice. To an attached router, the TCP/IP stack on System/390 simplylooks like another router. When the TCP/IP stack receives a packetdestined for one of its VIPAs, the inbound IP function of the TCP/IPstack notes that the IP address of the packet is in the TCP/IP stack'sHome list of IP addresses and forwards the packet up the TCP/IP stack.The “home list” of a TCP/IP stack is the list of IP addresses which are“owned” by the TCP/IP stack. Assuming the TCP/IP stack has multipleadapters or paths to it (including a Cross Coupling Facility (XCF) pathfrom other TCP/IP stacks in a Sysplex), if a particular physical adapterfails, the attached routing network will route VIPA-targeted packets tothe TCP/IP stack via an alternate route. The VIPA may, thus, be thoughtof as an address to the stack, and not to any particular adapter.

While the use of VIPAs may remove hardware and associated transmissionmedia as a single point of failure for large numbers of connections, theconnectivity of a server can still be lost through a failure of a singlestack or an MVS image. The VIPA Configuration manual for System/390tells the customer how to configure the VIPA(s) for a failed stack onanother stack, but this is a manual process. Substantial down time of afailed MVS image or TCP/IP stack may still result until operatorintervention to manually reconfigure the TCP/IP stacks in a Sysplex toroute around the failed TCP/IP stack or MVS image.

While merely restarting an application with a new IP address may resolvemany failures, applications use IP addresses in different ways and,therefore, such a solution may be inappropriate. The first time a clientresolves a name in its local domain, the local Dynamic Name Server (DNS)will query back through the DNS hierarchy to get to the authoritativeserver. For a Sysplex, the authoritative server should be DNS/WorkloadManager (WLM). DNS/WLM will consider relative workloads among the nodessupporting the requested application, and will return the IP address forthe most appropriate available server. IP addresses for servers that arenot available will not be returned. The Time to Live of the returned IPaddress will be zero, so that the next resolution query (on failure ofthe original server, for example) will go all the way back to theDNS/WLM that has the knowledge to return the IP address of an availableserver.

However, in practice, things do not always work as described above. Forexample, some clients are configured to a specific IP address, thusrequiring human intervention to go to another server. However, theperson using the client may not have the knowledge to reconfigure theclient for a new IP address. Additionally, some clients ignore the Timeto Live, and cache the IP address as long as the client is active. Humanintervention may again be required to recycle the client to obtain a newIP address. Also, DNSs are often deployed as a hierarchy to reducenetwork traffic, and DNSs may cache the IP address beyond the statedTime to Live even when the client behaves quite correctly. Thus, even ifthe client requests a new IP address, the client may receive the cachedaddress from the DNS. Finally, some users may prefer to configureDNS/WLM to send a Time to Live that is greater than zero, in an attemptto limit network-wide traffic to resolve names. Problems arising fromthese various scenarios may be reduced if the IP address with which theclient communicates does not change. However, as described above, toaffect such a movement of VIPAs between TCP/IP stacks requires operatorintervention and may result in lengthy down times for the applicationsassociated with the VIPA.

Previous approaches to increased availability focused on providing sparehardware. The High-Availability Coupled Multi-Processor (HACMP) designallows for taking over the MAC address of a failing adapter on a sharedmedium (LAN). This works both for a failing adapter (failover to a spareadapter on the same node) or for a failing node (failover to anothernode via spare adapter or adapters on the takeover node.) Spare adaptersare not used for IP traffic, but they are used to exchange heartbeatsamong cluster nodes for failure detection. All of the work on a failingnode goes to a single surviving node. In addition to spare adapters andaccess to the same application data, the designated failover node mustalso have sufficient spare processing capacity to handle the entirefailing node workload with “acceptable” service characteristics(response and throughput).

Automatic restart of failing applications also provides faster recoveryof a failing application or node. This may be acceptable when theapplication can be restarted in place, but is less useful when theapplication is moved to another node, unless the IP address known to theclients can be moved with the application, or dynamic DNS updates withalternate IP addresses can be propagated to a DNS local to clientssufficiently quickly.

Other attempts at error recovery have included the EDDIE systemdescribed in a paper titled “EDDIE, A Robust and Scalable InternetServer” by A. Dahlin, M. Froberg, J. Grebeno, J. Walerud, and P.Winroth, of Ericsson Telecom AB, Stockholm, Sweden, May 1998. In theEDDIE approach, a distributed application called “IP Address MigrationApplication” controls all IP addresses in the cluster. The cluster isconnected via a shared-medium LAN. IP address aliasing is used toprovide addresses to individual applications over a single adapter, andthese aliases are located via the Address Resolution Protocol (ARP) andARP caches in the TCP/IPs. The application monitors all serverapplications and hardware, and reallocates aliased IP addresses, in theevent of failure, to surviving adapters and nodes. This approach allowsapplications of a failing node to be distributed among surviving nodes,but it may require the monitoring application to have complete knowledgeof the application and network adapter topology in the cluster. In thissense, it is similar to existing Systems Management applications such asthose provided by International Business Machines Corporation's Tivoli®network management software, but the IP Address Migration Applicationhas direct access to adapters and ARP caches. The application alsorequires a dedicated IP address for inter-application communication andcoordination.

U.S. patent application Ser. No. 09/401,419 entitled “METHODS, SYSTEMSAND COMPUTER PROGRAM PRODUCTS FOR AUTOMATED MOVEMENT OF IP ADDRESSESWITHIN A CLUSTER” filed Sep. 22, 1999, the disclosure of which isincorporated herein by reference as if set forth fully herein, describesdynamic virtual IP addresses (VIPA) and their use. As described in the'419 application, a dynamic VIPA may be automatically moved fromprotocol stack to protocol stack in a predefined manner to overcomefailures of a particular protocol stack (i.e. VIPA takeover). Such apredefined movement may provide a predefined backup protocol stack for aparticular VIPA. VIPA takeover was made available by InternationalBusiness Machines Corporation (IBM), Armonk, N.Y., in System/390 V2R8which had a general availability date of September, 1999.

In addition to failure scenarios, scalability and load balancing arealso issues which have received considerable attention in light of theexpansion of the Internet. For example, it may be desirable to havemultiple servers servicing customers. The workload of such servers maybe balanced by providing a single network visible IP address which ismapped to multiple servers.

Such a mapping process may be achieved by, for example, network addresstranslation (NAT) facilities, dispatcher systems and IBM's Dynamic NameServer/Workload Management DNS/WLM systems. These various mechanisms forallowing multiple servers to share a single IP address are illustratedin FIGS. 1 through 3.

FIG. 1 illustrates a conventional network address translation system asdescribed above. In the system of FIG. 1, a client 10 communicates overa network 12 to a network address translation system 14. The networkaddress translation system receives the communications from the client10 and converts the communications from the addressing scheme of thenetwork 12 to the addressing scheme of the network 12′ and sends themessages to the servers 16. A server 16 may be selected from multipleservers 16 at connect time and may be on any host, one or more hopsaway. All inbound and outbound traffic flows through the NAT system 14.

FIG. 2 illustrates a conventional DNS/WLM system as described above. Asmentioned above, the server 16 is selected at name resolution time whenthe client 10 resolves the name for the destination server from DNS/WLMsystem 17 which is connected to the servers 16 through the couplingfacility 19 and to the network 12. As described above, the DNS/WLMsystem of FIG. 2 relies on the client 10 adhering to the zero time tolive.

FIG. 3 illustrates a conventional dispatcher system. As seen in FIG. 3,the client 10 communicates over the network 12 with a dispatcher system18 to establish a connection. The dispatcher/routes inbound packets tothe servers 16 and outbound packets are sent over network 12′ but mayflow over any available path to the client 10. The servers 16 aretypically on a directly connected network to the dispatcher 18 and aserver 16 is selected at connect time.

Such a dispatcher system is illustrated by the Interactive NetworkDispatcher function of the IBM 2216 and AIX platforms. In these systems,the same IP address that the Network Dispatcher node 18 advertises tothe routing network 12 is activated on server nodes 16 as a loopbackaddresses. The node performing the distribution function connects to theendpoint stack via a single hop connection because normal routingprotocols typically cannot be used to get a connection request from theendpoint to the distributing node if the endpoint uses the same IPaddress as the distributing node advertises. Network Dispatcher uses anapplication on the server to query a workload management function (suchas WLM of System/390), and collects this information at intervals, e.g.30 seconds or so. Applications running on the Network Dispatcher nodecan also issue “null” queries to selected application server instancesas a means of determining server instance health.

In addition to the above described systems, Cisco Systems offers aMulti-Node Load Balancing function on certain of its routers thatperform the distribution function. Such operations appear similar tothose of the IBM 2216.

In addition to the system described above, AceDirector from Alteonprovides a virtual IP address and performs network address translationto a real address of a selected server application. AceDirector appearsto observe connection request turnaround times and rejection as amechanism for determining server load capabilities.

A still further consideration which has arisen as a result of increaseduse of the Internet is security. Recently, the Internet has seen anincrease in use of Virtual Private Networks which utilize the Internetas a communications media but impose security protocols onto theInternet to provide secure communications between network hosts.Typically, these security protocols are intended to provide “end-to-end”security in that secure communications are provided for the entirecommunications path between two host processing systems. However,Internet security protocols, which are typically intended to provide“end-to-end” security between a source IP address and a destination IPaddress, may present difficulties for load balancing and failurerecovery.

As an example, the Internet Protocol Security Architecture (IPSec), is aVirtual Private Network (VPN) technology that operates on the networklayer (layer 3) in conjunction with an Internet Key Exchange (IKE)protocol component that operates at the application layer (layer 5 orhigher). IPSec uses symmetric keys to secure traffic between peers.These symmetric keys are generated and distributed by the IKE function.IPSec uses security associations (SAs) to provide security services totraffic. SAs are unidirectional logical connections between two IPSecsystems which may be uniquely identified by the triplet of <SecurityParameter Index, IP Destination Address, Security Protocol>. To providebidirectional communications, two SAs are defined, one in eachdirection.

SAs are managed by IPSec systems maintaining two databases; a SecurityPolicy Database (SPD) and a Security Associations Database (SAD). TheSPD specifies what security services are to be offered to the IPtraffic. Typically, the SPD contains an ordered list of policy entrieswhich are separate for inbound and outbound traffic. These policies mayspecify, for example, that some traffic must not go through IPSecprocessing, some traffic must be discarded and some traffic must beIPSec processed.

The SAD contains parameter information about each SA. Such parametersmay include the security protocol algorithms and keys for AuthenticationHeader (AH) or Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP) security protocols,sequence numbers, protocol mode and SA lifetime. For outboundprocessing, an SPD entry points to an entry in the SAD. In other words,the SPD determines which SA is to be used for a given packet. Forinbound processing, the SAD is consulted to determine how the packet isprocessed.

As described above, IPSec provides for two types of security protocols,Authentication Header (AH) and Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP). AHprovides origin authentication for an IP datagram by incorporating an AHheader which includes authentication information. ESP encrypts thepayload of an IP packet using shared secret keys. A single SA may beeither AH or ESP but not both. However, multiple SAs may be providedwith differing protocols. For example, two SAs could be established toprovide both AH and ESP protocols for communications between two hosts.

IPSec also supports two modes of SAs; transport mode and tunnel mode. Intransport mode, an IPSec header is inserted into the IP header of the IPdatagram. In the case of ESP, a trailer and optional ESP authenticationdata are appended to the end of the original payload. In tunnel mode, anew IP datagram is constructed and the original IP datagram is made thepayload of the new IP datagram. IPSec in transport mode is then appliedto the new IP datagram. Tunnel mode is typically used when either end ofa SA is a gateway.

SAs are negotiated between the two endpoints of the SA and may,typically, be established through prior negotiations or dynamically. IKEmay be utilized to negotiate a SA utilizing a two phase negotiation. Inphase 1, an Internet Security Association and Key Management Protocol(ISAKMP) security association is established. It is assumed that asecure channel does not exist and, therefore, one is established toprotect the ISAKMP messages. This security association in owned byISAKMP. During phase 1, the partners exchange proposals for the ISAKMPsecurity association and agree on one. The partners then exchangeinformation for generating a shared master secret. Both parties thengenerate keying material and shared secrets before exchanging additionalauthentication information.

In phase 2, subsequent security associations for other services arenegotiated. The ISAKMP security association is used to negotiate thesubsequent SAs. In phase 2, the partners exchange proposals for protocolSAs and agree on one. To generate keys, both parties use the keyingmaterial from phase 1 and may, optionally, perform additional exchanges.Multiple phase 2 exchanges may be provided under the same phase 1protection.

Once phase 1 and phase 2 exchanges have successfully completed, thepeers have reached a state where they can start to protect traffic withIPSec according to applicable policies and traffic profiles. The peerswould then have agreed on a proposal to authenticate each other and toprotect future IKE exchanges, exchanged enough secret and randominformation to create keying material for later key generation, mutuallyauthenticated the exchange, agreed on a proposal to authenticate andprotect data traffic with IPSec, exchanged further information togenerate keys for IPSec protocols, confirmed the exchange and generatedall necessary keys.

With IPSec in place, for host systems sending outbound packets, the SPDis consulted to determine if IPSec processing is required or if otherprocessing or discarding of the packet is to be performed. If IPSec isrequired, the SAD is searched for an existing SA for which the packetmatches the profile. If no SA is found, a new IKE negotiation is startedthat results in the desired SA being established. If an SA is found orafter negotiation of an SA, IPSec is applied to the packet as defined bythe SA and the packet is delivered.

For packets inbound to a host system, if IPSec is required, the SAD issearched for an existing security parameter index to match the securityparameter index of the inbound packet. If no match is found the packetis discarded. If a match is found, IPSec is applied to the packet asrequired by the SA and the SPD is consulted to determine if IPSec orother processing is required. Finally, the payload is delivered to thelocal process.

In light of the above discussion, various of the workload distributionmethods described above may have compatibility problems with IPSec.

SUMMARY OF THE INVENTION

Methods, systems and computer program products according to embodimentsof the present invention provide secure communications over a network ina distributed workload environment having target hosts which areaccessed through a distribution processor by a common network address.Secure communications are provided by routing both inbound and outboundcommunications with target hosts which are associated with a securenetwork communication through the distribution processor. Both inboundand outbound secure network communications are processed at thedistribution processor so as to provide network security processing ofcommunications from the target host and network security processing ofcommunications to the target host.

In particular embodiments of the present invention, networkcommunications directed to the common network address are received atthe distribution processor. The received network communications aredistributed to selected ones of the target hosts so as to distributeworkload associated with the network communications.

In further embodiments of the present invention, it may be determined ifthe received network communications are secure network communicationswhich are to be distributed to ones of the target hosts. If so,processing both inbound and outbound secure network communications atthe distribution processor may include processing the received networkcommunications so as to provide generic communications to the ones ofthe plurality of target hosts. Furthermore, communications from the onesof the target hosts which are associated with secure networkcommunications may be received at the distribution processor. Thereceived communications from the ones of the target hosts are processedso as to provide network security for the communications from the onesof the target hosts.

In particular embodiments, the communications received from the targethosts and the generic communications to ones of the plurality of targethosts may be encapsulated in a generic routing format. Furthermore, thegeneric communications may be encapsulated in a generic routing formathaving sufficient information in a header of the generic routing formatso as to authenticate the source of the communication between thedistributing processor and ones of the plurality of target hosts.

In still additional embodiments of the present invention, thecommunications received from the target hosts and the genericcommunications to ones of the plurality of target hosts are communicatedover trusted communication links.

In further embodiments, common IP filters are established forcommunications encapsulated in the generic routing format at thedistributing processor and the plurality of target hosts. The common IPfilters may bypass IP filtering for inbound communications encapsulatedin the generic routing format and associated with secure networkcommunications.

In still further embodiments of the present invention, Internet ProtocolSecurity (IPSec) communications are provided from a network to aplurality of application instances executing on a cluster of dataprocessing systems utilizing a virtual Internet Protocol Address (VIPA)Distributor to provide a routing communication protocol stack whichdistributes connections to at least one dynamically routable VIPA(DVIPA) to a plurality of target communication protocol stacks. IPSeccommunications are provided by receiving inbound IPSec communicationsfrom the network at the routing communication protocol stack andperforming IPSec processing of the received inbound IPSec communicationsat the routing communication protocol stack to provide non-IPSeccommunications to a first target communication protocol stack associatedwith the received inbound IPSec communications. Outbound non-IPSeccommunications from a second target communication protocol stack arealso received at the routing communication protocol stack and IPSecprocessing performed on the received outbound non-IPSec communicationsat the routing communication protocol stack to provide outbound IPSeccommunications to the network corresponding to the received outboundnon-IPSec communications.

In particular embodiments of the present invention, the targetcommunication protocol stacks send outbound communications associatedwith a connection utilizing IPSec which is routed through the routingcommunication protocol stack to the routing communication protocol stackfor IPSec processing. The target communication protocol may determine ifan outbound communication associated with a connection utilizing IPSecis routed through the routing communication protocol stack. If so,non-IPSec communications for the connection utilizing IPSec are directedto the routing communication protocol stack. The target communicationprotocol stack may perform IPSec processing of the communications if theconnection utilizing IPSec is not routed through the routingcommunication protocol stack.

In particular embodiments of the present invention, the routingcommunication protocol stack and the plurality of target communicationprotocol stacks communicate utilizing a trusted communication link.Furthermore, the cluster of data processing systems may be a Sysplex andthe trusted communication link may be a cross coupling facility of theSysplex.

In further embodiments of the present invention, the routingcommunication protocol stack encapsulates the IPSec processed receivedIPSec communications in a generic routing encapsulation (GRE) formattedcommunication and sends the GRE formatted communication to the firsttarget communication protocol stack over a trusted communication link.In such embodiments, receiving outbound non-IPSec communications from asecond target communication protocol stack at the routing communicationprotocol stack includes receiving a GRE encapsulated communication fromthe second target communication protocol stack. Similarly IPSecprocessing of the received outbound non-IPSec communications at therouting communication protocol stack to provide outbound IPSeccommunications to the network corresponding to the received outboundnon-IPSec communications may be provided by extracting a non-IPSeccommunication from the received GRE encapsulated communication and IPSecprocessing the extracted non-IPSec communication.

Additionally, common IP filters for GRE encapsulated communications maybe established at the routing communication protocol stack and thetarget communication protocol stacks. The common IP filters may bypassIP filtering for inbound GRE encapsulated communications associated withIPSec communications.

In particular embodiments of the present invention, the cluster of dataprocessing systems is a Sysplex and the routing communication protocolstack and the target communication protocol stacks communicate utilizinga cross coupling facility (XCF) of the Sysplex. Furthermore, the GREencapsulated communications include an XCF source address and an XCFdestination address in an outer GRE header. In such embodiments, an IPaddress of a physical link over which a GRE encapsulated communicationwas received and an IP address contained in the GRE encapsulatedcommunication may be evaluated to determine if the received GREencapsulated communication was received over an XCF link. The receivedGRE encapsulated communication may be discarded if the received GREencapsulated communication was not received over an XCF link.

As will further be appreciated by those of skill in the art, the presentinvention may be embodied as methods, apparatus/systems and/or computerprogram products.

BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS

FIG. 1 is block diagram of a conventional network address translationsystem;

FIG. 2 is block diagram of a conventional DNS/WLM system;

FIG. 3 is block diagram of a conventional dispatcher system;

FIG. 4 is block diagram of a cluster of data processing systemsincorporating embodiments of the present invention;

FIG. 5A is flowchart illustrating operations of a distributing processorfor inbound secure communications according to embodiments of thepresent invention;

FIG. 5B is a flowchart illustrating operations of a distributingprocessor for outbound secure communications according to embodiments ofthe present invention;

FIG. 6 is a flowchart illustrating operations of a target host accordingto embodiments of the present invention;

FIG. 7A is a flowchart illustrating operations of a backup distributingprocessor in response to a failure of a primary distributing processoraccording to embodiments of the present invention;

FIG. 7B is a flowchart illustrating operations of a target host inresponse to a failure of a primary distributing processor according toembodiments of the present invention;

FIG. 8A is a flowchart illustrating operations of a primary distributingprocessor upon recovery from a failure according to embodiments of thepresent invention;

FIG. 8B is a flowchart illustrating operations of a backup distributingprocessor upon recovery of a primary distributing processor from afailure according to embodiments of the present invention;

FIG. 9 is a block diagram of a CS/390 Sysplex incorporating SysplexDistributor incorporating Sysplex Wide Security Associations accordingto embodiments of the present invention;

FIG. 10 is a flowchart illustrating operations for initialization of arouting protocol stack incorporating distributable VIPAs and IPSecaccording to embodiments of the present invention;

FIG. 11 is a flowchart illustrating operations of a server protocolstack for handling messages associated with IPSec communicationsaccording to embodiments of the present invention;

FIG. 12 is a flowchart illustrating operations for a incomingcommunications from the network to the routing protocol stack accordingto embodiments of the present invention;

FIG. 13 is a flowchart illustrating operations of a routing protocolstack receiving communications from another protocol stack according toembodiments of the present invention;

FIG. 14 is a flowchart illustrating operations of protocol stacks duringfailure of a routing protocol stack according to embodiments of thepresent invention; and

FIG. 15 is a flowchart illustrating operations of protocol stacks forrecovery of a failed routing protocol stack according to embodiments ofthe present invention.

DETAILED DESCRIPTION OF THE INVENTION

The present invention now will be described more fully hereinafter withreference to the accompanying drawings, in which preferred embodimentsof the invention are shown. This invention may, however, be embodied inmany different forms and should not be construed as limited to theembodiments set forth herein; rather, these embodiments are provided sothat this disclosure will be thorough and complete, and will fullyconvey the scope of the invention to those skilled in the art. Likenumbers refer to like elements throughout.

As will be appreciated by those of skill in the art, the presentinvention can take the form of an entirely hardware embodiment, anentirely software (including firmware, resident software, micro-code,etc.) embodiment, or an embodiment containing both software and hardwareaspects. Furthermore, the present invention can take the form of acomputer program product on a computer-usable or computer-readablestorage medium having computer-usable or computer-readable program codemeans embodied in the medium for use by or in connection with aninstruction execution system. In the context of this document, acomputer-usable or computer-readable medium can be any means that cancontain, store, communicate, propagate, or transport the program for useby or in connection with the instruction execution system, apparatus, ordevice.

The computer-usable or computer-readable medium can be, for example, butis not limited to, an electronic, magnetic, optical, electromagnetic,infrared, or semiconductor system, apparatus, device, or propagationmedium. More specific examples (a nonexhaustive list) of thecomputer-readable medium would include the following: an electricalconnection having one or more wires, a removable computer diskette, arandom access memory (RAM), a read-only memory (ROM), an erasableprogrammable read-only memory (EPROM or Flash memory), an optical fiber,and a portable compact disc read-only memory (CD-ROM). Note that thecomputer-usable or computer-readable medium could even be paper oranother suitable medium upon which the program is printed, as theprogram can be electronically captured, via, for instance, opticalscanning of the paper or other medium, then compiled, interpreted, orotherwise processed in a suitable manner if necessary, and then storedin a computer memory.

The present invention can be embodied as systems, methods, or computerprogram products which allow for end-to-end network security to beprovided in a cluster of data processing systems which utilize a commonIP address and have workload utilizing the common IP address distributedto data processing systems in the cluster. Such secure networkcommunications may be provided by forcing all communications which aresecure network communications through a distributing processor in thecluster of data processing systems and performing all securityprocessing at the distributing processor. Thus, inbound and outboundcommunications utilizing the common IP address would be routed throughthe distributing processor which would perform security processing forthe cluster of data processing systems.

Embodiments of the present invention will now be described withreference to FIGS. 4 through 15 which are flowchart and block diagramillustrations of operations of protocol stacks incorporating embodimentsof the present invention. It will be understood that each block of theflowchart illustrations and/or block diagrams, and combinations ofblocks in the flowchart illustrations and/or block diagrams, can beimplemented by computer program instructions. These program instructionsmay be provided to a processor to produce a machine, such that theinstructions which execute on the processor create means forimplementing the functions specified in the flowchart and/or blockdiagram block or blocks. The computer program instructions may beexecuted by a processor to cause a series of operational steps to beperformed by the processor to produce a computer implemented processsuch that the instructions which execute on the processor provide stepsfor implementing the functions specified in the flowchart and/or blockdiagram block or blocks.

Accordingly, blocks of the flowchart illustrations and/or block diagramssupport combinations of means for performing the specified functions,combinations of steps for performing the specified functions and programinstruction means for performing the specified functions. It will alsobe understood that each block of the flowchart illustrations and/orblock diagrams, and combinations of blocks in the flowchartillustrations and/or block diagrams, can be implemented by specialpurpose hardware-based systems which perform the specified functions orsteps, or combinations of special purpose hardware and computerinstructions.

FIG. 4 illustrates an environment in which embodiments of the presentinvention may be utilized. As seen in FIG. 4, the client 10 communicateswith the network 12 to communicate with a distributing processor 50. Thedistributing processor 50 may perform workload management and maydistribute connections to a single IP address to one of the servers 52,54 or 56 such that the client 10 may communicate with any of the servers52, 54 or 56 utilizing the single IP address as a destination address.The distributing processor 50 may also function as a server and, thus,be the ultimate endpoint of communications with the client 10.Furthermore, as illustrated in FIG. 4, the distributing processor 50 mayalso provide for routing of secure network communications utilizing thesingle IP address between the servers 52, 54 and 56 and the network 12.The servers 52, 54 and 56 and the distributing processor 50 may be dataprocessing systems in a cluster of data processing systems.

In operation, when the distributing processor 50 receives communicationsfrom the client 10 to the single IP address, the distributing processor50 routes these communications to appropriate ones of the servers 52, 54or 56. Outbound communications from the servers 52, 54 or 56 need not berouted through the distributing processor 50, however, if thecommunications are secure network communications, the distributingprocessor 50 provides security processing for both inbound and outboundcommunications. For example, a connection utilizing the single IPaddress which does not utilize network security, such as a connection tothe server 56, may have inbound communications routed through thedistributing processor 50 and to the server 56 while outboundcommunications 51 are routed from the server 56 to the network 12without passing through the distributing processor 50.

As briefly mentioned above, for connections utilizing network security,the distributing processor 50 performs network security processing forboth inbound and outbound communications. Thus, as seen in FIG. 4, theconnections to the servers 52 and 54 which utilize network security arerouted through the distributing processor 50 for both inbound andoutbound communications. The communications between the servers 52 and54 and the distributing processor 50 need not utilize a network securityprotocol as they would be routed over a trusted communications link.Network security based on a network security protocol is applied to theoutbound communications and removed from the inbound communications bythe distributing processor 50. Thus, the distributing processor 50 isillustrated as having a network security function, such as the IPSecfunction 60 illustrated in FIG. 4, which may provide network securityprocessing, such as IPSec processing, for inbound and outboundcommunications with the network 12 even though the communications areoriginated by or distributed to the servers 52 and 54. The IPSecfunction 60 may include, for example, a communication protocol stacksupporting IPSec and an IKE application. Other security protocols mayalso be utilized while still benefitting from the teachings of thepresent invention.

As mentioned above, the communications between the distributingprocessor 50 and the servers 52 and 54 are communicated over a trustedcommunication link and, therefore, need not use the network security.Such a trusted communication link may be provided, for example, by theinterconnections between the data processing systems when co-located ina physically secure environment, a logically secure environment or both.For example, a physically secure environment may be provided by a localarea network in a secure building. A logically secure environment may beprovided by, for example, the cross coupling facility (XCF) in an OS/390Sysplex such that the communications between the distributing processor50 and the servers 52 and 54 are provided using XCF links. As will beappreciated by those of skill in the art, the XCF links may be logicallysecure or both logically and physically secure. Similarly, encryptioncould also be provided for communications between data processingsystems in the cluster such that the communications could be transmittedover a non-secure transmission media. As will be appreciated by those ofskill in the art in light of the present disclosure, other trustedmechanisms for communications within the cluster of data processingsystems may also be utilized.

Returning to FIG. 4, the distributing processor 50 may also provide IPfiltering for communications with the network 12. Similarly, thedistributing processor 50 and the servers 52 and 54 may provide IPfiltering for communications between each other. Thus, the servers 52and 54 and the distributing processor 50 are illustrated asincorporating an IP filter function 62. The IP filter policies may bethe same on each of the servers 52 and 54 which may simplifyconfiguration of data processing systems in the cluster of dataprocessing systems. Furthermore, in particular embodiments, the IPfiltering may also be the same for the distributing processor 50.

To facilitate use of consistent IP filtering policies within thecluster, it is preferred that inbound IP filtering be bypassed forcommunications within the cluster of distributed traffic associated withan external connection employing network security. Also, outboundfiltering may be bypassed for distributed traffic from the network. Sucha selective bypass of IP filtering may be provided by the communicationsbetween the distributing processor 50 and the servers 52 which areassociated with communications on the network 12 utilizing a networksecurity protocol being encapsulated into, for example, a genericrouting format. Consistent policies could then be provided which bypassIP filtering for such encapsulated communications. Normal IP filtercould then be applied to other communications. Accordingly, existing IPfiltering externals need not be changed and a consistent policy may beprovided for all processing systems in the cluster of data processingsystems.

FIG. 4 also illustrates a common storage 64 which may be utilized inerror recovery situations. In such error conditions, another dataprocessing system in the cluster may be designated as a backupdistributing processor. For example, the server 52 or the server 54 maybe designated as a backup distributing processor. The primarydistributing processor 50 would place network security protocolinformation in the common storage 64 so as to allow a backupdistributing processor to access this information in the event offailure. The information would be sufficient to allow the backupdistributing processor to take over network security processing for thecommunications on the network 12. For example, if the network securityprotocol is IPSec, Phase 1 SA and/or Phase 2 SA information about eachof the IPSec SAs could be stored in the common storage 64.

In the event of failure of the distributing processor 50, the backupdistributing processor, for example the server 52, would access thecommon storage 64 and take over the routing and security processing ofthe communications utilizing the security protocol which were beinghandled by the primary distributing processor 50. The backupdistributing processor would also place information in the commonstorage 64 from which the communications utilizing the network securityprotocol could be established at another data processing system in thecluster. In the event that the primary distributing processor 50recovers from the failure, the primary distributing processor 50 maytake back handling the routing and security processing. Such a recoverymay be accomplished by notifying the backup distributing processor ofthe primary distributing processor 50 recovery and utilizing theinformation in the common storage 64 to move the communicationsutilizing the security protocol back to the primary distributingprocessor 50.

As will be appreciated by those of skill in the art, while the commonstorage 64 may be utilized to share information which may allow movementof security protocol processing within a cluster of data processingsystems, other such information sharing techniques may also be utilized.For example, information could be broadcast or otherwise transmitted tobackup distributing processors by the primary distributing processor andthe information maintained at each potential backup. Similarly, thebackup distributing processors could broadcast or otherwise transmit theinformation to a recovering primary distributing processor uponnotification of the recovery of the primary distributing processor.Accordingly, other mechanisms for sharing information to provide backupand failure recovery may be utilized while still benefitting from theteachings of the present invention.

Operations according to particular embodiments of the present inventionwill now be described with reference to the flowcharts of FIGS. 5Athrough 8B. As seen in FIG. 5A, when the distributing processor 50receives a communication from the network 12, the distributing processor50 may determine if the communication is a secure communication (block70). If the communication is not a secure communication, then nosecurity processing need be done on the communication and it may beprocessed normally by applying the inbound IP filters (block 77) and, ifdistributed (block 78), selectively applying outbound IP filters to thecommunication and sending it over the communication link to itsdestination within the cluster of data processing systems (block 82). Ifnot distributed, the inbound IP filters may be applied (block 77) andthe information provided to the local process (block 80). For example, acommunication which is not using a network security protocol may bereceived by the distributing processor 50 and provided to the server 56.

If, however, the communication is a secure communication (block 70), thedistributing processor 50 determines if the communication is associatedwith an existing security relationship (block 72). If not, thecommunication may be discarded (block 74). If a security relationshipdoes exist (block 72), the secure communication is processed based onthe security protocol (block 76) and may also be inbound IP filtered(block 77).

In any event, after security processing of the received communication toprovide the information of the communication without the security thereceived communication may also be inbound filtered. If the informationis not for a distributed destination (block 78) (i.e. is for a processor service executing locally on the distributing processor 50), theinformation is provided to the local process (block 80). If thecommunication is for a destination which is distributed by thedistributing processor 50 (block 78), the outbound filtering may beselectively bypassed and the information sent to the destinationprocessing system in the cluster of data processing systems (block 82).Optionally, outbound filtering could be applied to such communications.

Furthermore, in particular embodiments, the information may beencapsulated in a generic routing format prior to distribution withinthe cluster of data processing systems after block 82. As describedabove, such an encapsulation may provide for simplified filter policieson the data processing systems as it may allow for the efficientseparation of communications associated with secure networkcommunications from other communications.

FIG. 5B illustrates operations of the distributing processor 50 when acommunication is received from another data processing system in thecluster of data processing systems. As seen in FIG. 5B, when thedistributing processor 50 receives a communication from within thecluster of data processing systems, the distributing processor 50 mayselectively apply its inbound IP filter to the communication and applythe outbound IP filter to the communication (block 84). As describedabove, the inbound IP filtering is preferably bypassed if thecommunication is associated with a network communication utilizing anetwork security protocol. Furthermore, the determination to bypass theinbound IP filtering may be made based on the message being encapsulatedin the generic routing format as described above.

In any event, the distributing processor 50 also determines if securityis specified for the communication (block 86), for example, by theoutbound IP filter specifying security for the communication. Such adetermination could also be made by evaluation of the communication ormay be based on the encapsulation of the communication in the genericrouting format or both. If security is not specified for thecommunication, then no security processing need be done on thecommunication and it may be processed normally and sent to the network12 (block 94). If, however, the communication is associated with anetwork communication utilizing a network security protocol (block 86),the distributing processor 50 determines if the communication isassociated with an existing security relationship (block 88), such as asecure connection. If not, a security relationship may be established(block 90). Such a security relationship may be established dynamicallyby sending a secure communication or through a request mechanism. Aspart of the establishing of the security relationship, the distributingprocessor 50 may store information sufficient to reestablish thesecurity relationship in the common storage 64. Optionally, if aseparate communication, such as a NEWCONN message, is used to establishsecurity relationships, the communication could be discarded until thesecurity relationship was established.

After establishing the security relationship, or if the relationship waspreviously established (block 88), the secure communication is processedbased on the security protocol (block 92). Such processing may beoptional if a previous security relationship has not been established.For example, in IPSec, the communications may be discarded until a Phase2 SA was established. In such a case, the security processing ofreceived communications would not commence until a communication wasreceived after the security relationship was established. Suchoperations could be reflected in FIG. 5B by the output of block 90 beingmoved to terminate at the END block. In any event, after securityprocessing of the received communication to apply the security protocolto the communication, the information is sent onto the network 12 (block94).

FIG. 6 illustrates operations of a server, such as the servers 52 and 54in FIG. 4, for sending communications to the network. The serverdetermines if the communication is associated with a networkcommunication utilizing a network security protocol block 95). If not,then the communication may be processed normally (block 97) by, forexample, sending the communication directly to network 12. If, however,the communication is associated with a network communication utilizing anetwork security protocol (block 95), then it is determined if thecommunication is for a distributed IP address (block 96). If not, thecommunication is processed normally (i.e. network security processing isperformed locally) (block 97). If the communication is for a distributedIP address, the server sends the communication to the distributingprocessor 50 for security protocol processing and forwarding to thenetwork 12 (block 98). As described above, such transmission of thecommunication to the distributing processor 50 may involve encapsulatingthe communication in a generic routing format and forwarding theencapsulated communication to the distributing processor.

Furthermore, in addition to the operations described above withreference to FIGS. 5A through 6, the distributing processor 50 and theservers 52 and 54 may also evaluate the communications between them todetermine the authenticity of the source so as to reduce the likelihoodof an unauthorized entity “spoofing” either the distributing processor50 or the servers 52 and 54. Such an evaluation may, for example, bemade by including information in the encapsulated communication suchthat the physical link over which the communication was received may becompared to the source of the encapsulated communication. If theencapsulated communication is not received from a physical linkassociated with the source of the encapsulated communication, then thecommunication could be discarded.

FIGS. 7A and 7B are flowcharts illustrating operations of a backupdistributing processor and servers according to embodiments of thepresent invention incorporating failure recovery. FIG. 7A illustratesoperations of the backup distributing processor which may be anyprocessor in the cluster of data processing systems capable of carryingout the security processing and distribution operations of the primarydistributing processor 50. As seen in FIG. 7A, the backup distributingprocessor detects the failure of the primary distributing processor(block 100). Such detection may be provided utilizing various mechanismsincluding notification of the failure of the primary distributingprocessor 50, periodic polling, communication traffic monitoring, or thelike.

When the failure is detected, the backup distributing processor obtainsthe security information for communications distributed by the primarydistributing processor 50 from the common storage 64 (block 102). Theobtained security information is used to establish securityrelationships to the backup distributing processor (block 104)over thenetwork 12. The information obtained from the common storage 64 may beremoved from the common storage 64 after it is obtained by the backupdistributing processor, preferably, after the new security relationshipsare established. The backup distributing processor also places theinformation for recovery of the newly established security relationshipsin the common storage 64 (block 106).

The backup distributing processor may also notify other data processingsystems in the cluster that it has taken over as the distributingprocessor (block 108) so that subsequent communications associated withcommunications on network 12 utilizing a security protocol will be sentto the backup distributing processor. Furthermore, if the backupdistributing processor was receiving communications to a distributed IPaddress, these connections are marked as local to the backupdistributing processor (block 110).

FIG. 7B illustrates operations of the servers 52 and 54 when the primarydistributing processor 50 fails. As seen in FIG. 7B, the servers 52 and54 receive notification from the backup distributing processor that ithas taken over the previous distributed communications (block 112). Theservers 52 and 54 then route outbound secure communications fordistributed addresses to the new distributing processor (block 114).Such outbound communications may be processed by the servers 52 and 54as described above with reference to FIG. 6.

FIGS. 8A and 8B describe operations of the backup distributing processorand the primary distributing processor upon recovery of the failedprimary distributing processor. As seen in FIG. 8A, when a distributingprocessor has recovered from a failure, the recovered distributingprocessor notifies the backup distributing processor that it hasrecovered (block 120). The recovering distributing processor thenobtains the security information from the common storage 64 (block 122).The obtained security information is used to establish securityrelationships to the recovering distributing processor (block 124) overthe network 12. The information obtained from the common storage 64 maybe removed from the common storage 64 after it is obtained by therecovering distributing processor, preferably, after the new securityrelationships have been established. The recovering distributingprocessor also places the information for recovery of the newlyestablished security relationships in the common storage 64 (block 126).The recovering distributing processor may also notify other dataprocessing systems in the cluster that it has taken over as thedistributing processor (block 128) so that subsequent communicationsassociated with communications on network 12 utilizing a securityprotocol will be sent to the recovering distributing processor.

FIG. 8B illustrates operations of the backup distributing processor whenthe primary distributing processor recovers from a failure. The backupdistributing processor receives the notification of recovery of theprimary distributing processor (block 130) and terminates ownership ofany existing secure communications (block 132). The backup distributingprocessor also prevents updates of the common storage 64 with anyadditional security information (block 134). Furthermore, to the extentthat the backup distributing processor had any distributed connectionsas local, these connections are marked as distributed (block 136). Suchdistributed connections would then be handled as described above withreference to the servers 52 and 54.

While the present invention is described above with reference toservers, such servers may also be referred to as hosts, target hosts ortarget data processing systems and represent an endpoint forcommunications from the network. Similarly, the distributing processormay be a data processing system or other network device capable ofcarrying out the operations described herein. Furthermore, whileembodiments of the present invention are described with reference to afailure and recovery scenario, as will be appreciated by those of skillin the art, operations such as those described herein for movement of adistributing processor may be carried out for other reasons. Forexample, the primary distributing processor may be taken offline formaintenance, or a new distributing processor may be incorporated intothe cluster of data processing systems. Thus, embodiments of the presentinvention should not be construed as limited to the “failure” scenarioas the teachings of the present invention may be applicable to anyscenario where the distribution function for an IP address is to bemoved.

As described above, through the use of particular embodiments of thepresent invention, a cluster of data processing systems may appear as asingle data processing system to the network for security purposes. Assuch, end-to-end security may be provided between the cluster of dataprocessing systems and a network accessible device. For network securitypurposes, the distributing processor provides the endpoint for thecluster of data processing systems, thus allowing the communications tobe distributed throughout the cluster without requiring each dataprocessing system to provide network security processing or beindividually accessible as endpoints of communications employing thenetwork security protocol.

In particular embodiments of the present invention, IPSec is provided toa Sysplex cluster utilizing Sysplex Distributor. The Sysplex Distributorwas provided in OS/390 V2R10 (General Availability of September, 1999)and is described in detail in commonly assigned U.S. patent applicationSer. No. 09/640,409, entitled “METHODS, SYSTEMS AND COMPUTER PROGRAMPRODUCTS FOR CLUSTER WORKLOAD DISTRIBUTION”, U.S. patent applicationSer. No. 09/640,412, entitled “METHODS, SYSTEMS AND COMPUTER PROGRAMPRODUCTS FOR NON-DISRUPTIVELY TRANSFERRING A VIRTUAL INTERNET PROTOCOLADDRESS BETWEEN COMMUNICATION PROTOCOL STACKS” and U.S. patentapplication Ser. No. 09/640,438, entitled “METHODS, SYSTEMS AND COMPUTERPROGRAM PRODUCTS FOR FAILURE RECOVERY FOR ROUTED VIRTUAL INTERNETPROTOCOL ADDRESSES”, the disclosures of which are incorporated herein byreference as if set forth fully herein. Such systems have previouslyattempted to provide IPSec support by having the IPSec endpoint be adistributing host and a TCP endpoint be the target hosts. However, sucha difference may lead to security complexities and inconsistencieswithin the Sysplex. Such inconsistencies have lead to OS/390 V2R10requiring that all IPSec traffic not be distributed, thus deprivingIPSec traffic of the benefits of distribution provided by the systems ofthe above reference patent applications. Embodiments of the presentinvention may overcome such a limitation.

In Sysplex Distributor, a single IP address is associated with aplurality of communication protocol stacks in a cluster of dataprocessing systems by providing a routing protocol stack whichassociates a Virtual IP Address (VIPA) and port with other communicationprotocol stacks in the cluster and routes communications to the VIPA andport to the appropriate communication protocol stack. VIPAs capable ofbeing shared by a number of communication protocol stacks are referredto herein as “dynamic routable VIPAs” (DVIPA). While the presentinvention is described with reference to a specific embodiment in aSystem/390 Sysplex, as will be appreciated by those of skill in the art,the present invention may be utilized in other systems where clusters ofcomputers utilize virtual addresses by associating an application orapplication group rather than a particular communications adapter withthe addresses. Thus, the present invention should not be construed aslimited to the particular exemplary embodiments described herein.

A cluster of data processing systems is illustrated in FIG. 9 as acluster of nodes in Sysplex 10. As seen in FIG. 9, several dataprocessing systems 20, 24, 28, 32 and 36 are interconnected in a Sysplex10. The data processing systems 20, 24, 28, 32 and 36 illustrated inFIG. 9 may be operating system images, such as MVS images, executing onone or more computer systems. While the present invention will bedescribed primarily with respect to the MVS operating system executingin a System/390 environment, the data processing systems 20, 24, 28, 32and 36 may be mainframe computers, mid-range computers, servers or othersystems capable of supporting dynamic routable Virtual IP Addresses asdescribed herein.

As is further illustrated in FIG. 9, the data processing systems 20, 24,28, 32 and 36 have associated with them communication protocol stacks22, 26, 30, 34 and 38, which may be TCP/IP stacks. The communicationprotocol stacks 22, 26, 30, 34 and 38 have been modified to incorporatea VIPA distribution function 23 as described herein for providingdynamic routable VIPAs so as to provide a single IP address for multiplecommunication protocol stacks.

While each of the communication protocol stacks 22, 26, 30, 34 and 38illustrated in FIG. 9 incorporate the VIPA distribution function 23, notall communication protocol stacks in a Sysplex need incorporate the VIPAdistribution function 23. Thus, the present invention may be carried outon any system where two or more communication protocol stacks in acluster of data processing systems support dynamic routable VIPAS. If acommunication protocol stack does not support dynamic routable VIPA,then the dynamic routable VIPA messages according to the presentinvention would be ignored by the communication protocol stack. Thus,the present invention provides backward compatibility with existingcommunication protocol stacks.

As is further seen in FIG. 9, the communication protocol stacks 22, 26,30, 34 and 38 may communicate with each other through a couplingfacility 40 of the Sysplex 10, for example, utilizing XCF messaging.Furthermore, the communication protocol stacks 22 and 38 may communicatewith an external network 44 such as the Internet, an intranet, a LocalArea Network (LAN) or Wide Area Network (WAN) utilizing the EnterpriseSystem Connectivity (ESCON) 42. Thus, a client 46 may utilize thenetwork 44 to communicate with an application executing on an MVS imagein Sysplex 10 through the communication protocol stacks 22 and 38 whichmay function as routing protocol stacks as described herein.

As is further illustrated in FIG. 9, as an example of utilization of thepresent invention and for illustration purposes, data processing system20 has associated with it communication protocol stack 22 which isassociated with MVS image MVS 1 which has application APP A executing onMVS image MVS 1 and utilizing communication protocol stack 22 to allowaccess to, for example, client 46 through network 44. Furthermore, thecommunication protocol stack 22 is capable of IPSec processing managingand accessing the SPD 27 and SAD 25. MVS image MVS 1 also has aninstance of the IKE application executing to allow negotiation of IPSecSAs. Similarly, data processing system 24 has associated with itcommunication protocol stack 26 which is associated with MVS image MVS 2which has a second instance of application APP A and an instance ofapplication APP B executing on MVS image MVS 2 which may utilizecommunication protocol stack 26 for communications. Data processingsystem 28 has associated with it communication protocol stack 30 whichis associated with MVS image MVS 3 which has a second instance ofapplication APP B executing on MVS image MVS 3 which may utilizecommunication protocol stack 30 for communications. Data processingsystem 32 has associated with it communication protocol stack 34 whichis associated with MVS image MVS 4 which has a third instance ofapplication APP A executing on MVS image MVS 4 which may utilizecommunication protocol stack 34 for communications. Finally, dataprocessing system 36 has associated with it communication protocol stack38 which is associated with MVS image MVS 5 which has a third instanceof application APP B executing on MVS image MVS 5 which may utilizecommunication protocol stack 38 for communications. Furthermore, thecommunication protocol stack 38 is capable of IPSec processing, managingand accessing the SPD 27 and SAD 25. MVS image MVS 5 also has aninstance of the IKE application executing to allow negotiation of IPSecSAs.

Utilizing the above described system configuration as an example, theVIPA distribution function 23 with IPSec support will now be described.The VIPA distribution function 23 allows for protocol stacks which aredefined as supporting DVIPAs to share the DVIPA and communicate withnetwork 44 through a routing protocol stack such that all protocolstacks having a server application which is associated with the DVIPAwill appear to the network 44 as a single IP address. Such dynamicallyroutable VIPAs may be provided by designating a protocol stack, such asprotocol stack 22, as a routing protocol stack, notifying other protocolstacks of the routing protocol stack and having other protocol stacksnotify the routing protocol stack when an application which binds to theDVIPA is started. Such routing protocol stacks also provide IPSecprocessing for the DVIPA and, therefore, operate as distributingprocessors as described above.

Because communications to the DVIPA are routed through the routingprotocol stack, the routing protocol stack may provide work loadbalancing by distributing connections to the other protocol stacks onMVS images executing server applications which bind to the DVIPA tobalance workload while still providing IPSec capabilities for suchdistributed connections. Furthermore, in particular embodiments of thepresent invention, scalability and availability may be provided byallowing all protocol stacks for MVS images which execute applicationswhich bind to the DVIPA to have communications routed through therouting protocol stack without user intervention to establish therouting path.

Further aspects of the VIPA distribution function 23 according toembodiments of the present invention allow automated movement of arouting protocol function to a backup stack. Another aspect of the VIPAdistribution function 23 allows recovery of a failed routing stackwithout disruption to connections through the backup stack.

The communication protocol stacks 22, 26, 30, 34 and 38 may beconfigured as to which stacks are routing stacks, backup routing stacksand server stacks. Different DVIPAs may have different sets of backupstacks, possibly overlapping. The definition of backup stacks may be thesame as that for the VIPA takeover function described in U.S. patentapplication Ser. No. 09/401,419, entitled “METHODS, SYSTEMS AND COMPUTERPROGRAM PRODUCTS FOR AUTOMATED MOVEMENT OF IP ADDRESSES WITHIN ACLUSTER” which is incorporated herein by reference as if set forth fullyherein.

In providing for DVIPAs and IPSec, up to five or more aspects of DVIPAoperation may be addressed: 1) initialization and definition of DVIPAsand the affected protocol stacks; 2) incoming communications fromnetwork 44 to the DVIPA; 3) connections originated by a protocol stack(i.e. outgoing to network 44); 4) failure of a routing stack; and 5)recovery of a routing stack.

Turning now to the first of these aspects, for the present example,application APP A is associated with DVIPA VA1 which may be associatedwith the respective first, second and third instances of APP A; andapplication APP B likewise has DVIPA VB1 associated with the respectivefirst, second and third instances of APP B.

Configuration of a dynamic routable VIPA may be provided by a definitionblock established by a system administrator for each routingcommunication protocol stack 22 and 38. Such a definition block isdescribed in the above referenced United States Patent Applications anddefines dynamic routable VIPAs for which a communication protocol stackoperates as the primary communication protocol stack. Backup protocolstacks may be defined as described of the VIPA takeover procedure. Thus,the definition block “VIPADynamic” may be used to define dynamicroutable VIPAs. Within the VIPADynamic block a definition may also beprovided for a protocol stack supporting moveable VIPAs. All of theVIPAs in a single VIPADEFine statement should belong to the same subnet,network, or supernet, as determined by the network class and addressmask. VIPAs may also be defined as moveable VIPAs which may betransferred from one communication protocol stack to another.

Similarly, within the definitions, a protocol stack may be defined as abackup protocol stack and a rank (e.g. a number between 1 and 254)provided to determine relative order within the backup chain(s) for theassociated dynamic routable VIPA(s). A communication protocol stack witha higher rank will take over the dynamic VIPAs before a communicationprotocol stack with a lower rank.

Within the VIPADYNamic block, a VIPA may be defined as a dynamicroutable VIPA based on a VIPA address and a portlist which is a list ofports for which the DVIPA will apply. Alternatively, all ports for an IPaddress may be considered as DVIPAs. Also provided in the definition isa list of protocol stacks which will be included as server stacks inrouting communications directed to the DVIPA. The IP addresses whichdefine the potential server stacks may be XCF addresses of the protocolstacks or may be designated “ALL.” If “ALL” is designated, then allstacks in the Sysplex are candidates for distribution. This may includefuture stacks which are not active when the routing stack isinitialized. Thus, if ALL is specified, a protocol stack may be added tothe DVIPA without disruption of operations and without user interventionto redefine the stack in the VIPADynamic block. In addition to the abovedefinitions, a range of IP addresses may be defined as DVIPAs utilizingthe VIPARange definition.

The communication protocol stacks 22 and 38, which are designated asrouting protocol stacks as they have connections to the network 44,support IPSec processing, have an IKE instance and includeVIPADISTribute statements in the VIPADynamic block and publish thedistribution information through messages broadcast by the VIPA takeoverfunction 23 of each of the communication protocol stacks 22, 26, 30, 34and 38 to the other communication protocol stacks 22, 26, 30, 34 and 38.At initialization or profile changes, the communication protocol stacks22, 26, 30, 34 and 38 communicate to partner communication protocolstacks the complete list of dynamic routable VIPAs, their associatedpotential servers and list of ports and the primary and backupdefinitions for the communication protocol stack.

When a communication protocol stack 22, 26, 30, 34 and 38 receives theDVIPA information it notes if it is identified as a candidate targetprotocol stack or as a backup stack. If the protocol stack is acandidate target stack, it monitors its applications and sends a messageto the defined routing stack when an application instance is bound tothe DVIPA and listens on a defined port. If the protocol stack is abackup stack, it stores the DVIPA information for use in the event offailure of the primary routing stack.

Returning to the example of FIG. 9, for MVS1 to MVS5, the VIPADEFinestatements may be:

-   -   MVS1:VIPADEFine MOVEable IMMEDiate DVA1 VIPADISTribute DVA1 PORT        60 DESTIP XCF1, XCF2, XCF4    -   MVS5:VIPADEFine MOVEable IMMEDiate DVB1 VIPADISTribute DVB1 PORT        60 DESTIP ALL VIPADISTribute DVA1 PORT 60 DESTIP XCF2, XCF3,        XCF4        For purposes of illustration, the respective address masks have        been omitted because they are, typically, only significant to        the routing daemons. In the above illustration, XCF1 is an XCF        address of the TCP/IP stack on MVS1, XCF2 is an XCF address of        the TCP/IP stack on MVS2 and XCF3 is an XCF address of the        TCP/IP stack on MVS4. Note that, for purposes of the present        example, definitions for MVS2, MVS3, and MVS4 are not specified.        Such may be the case because the protocol stacks for these MVS        images are candidate target protocol stacks and are not        identified as routing protocol stacks and, therefore, receive        their dynamic routable VIPA definitions from the routing        protocol stacks. As is further illustrated, the backup routing        communication protocol stack may have a separate VIPADISTribute        definition for a DVIPA than the primary routing communication        protocol stack. As described in more detail below, in such a        case, the explicit definition of the VIPADISTribute statement        for the backup routing communication protocol stack in the event        of failure of the primary routing stack. Additional VIPA        definitions may also be provided, however, in the interests of        clarity, such definitions have been omitted.

The VIPABackup statements for MVS1 and MVS5 of FIG. 9 may be:

-   -   MVS1: VIPABackup 30 DVB1    -   MVS5: VIPABackup 10 DVA1

Furthermore, IP security policies that effect DVIPA traffic (from an IKEperspective) are replicated on each of MVS image. Similarly, from aprotocol stack perspective, policies (i.e. anchor rules) that areapplicable to DVIPA traffic are made identical on each MVS image.Additionally, the ordering of the rules should allow for consistentapplication of security policy on all MVS images.

FIG. 10 illustrates operations of a routing communication protocolstack, such as the protocol stacks 22 and 38 in FIG. 9 in the presentexample. As seen in FIG. 10, the dynamic routable VIPA is defined asdescribed above to include the candidate target stack XCF IP addressesand the ports for the DVIPA (block 200). In the present example, theprotocol stack 22 has DVIPA DVA1 identified as the dynamic routableVIPA, port 60 is routable and the candidate target stacks arecommunication protocol stacks corresponding to XCF addresses XCF1, XCF2,and XCF4. The protocol stack 38 has DVIPA DVB1 identified as the dynamicroutable VIPA, port 60 is routable and the candidate target stacks arespecified by the “ALL” value and may be any stack in the cluster.

Also the policy filter rules are established on each of the routingcommunication protocol stacks (block 202). The routing communicationprotocol stack distributes the list of DVIPAs, ports and candidatetarget stacks to each of the stacks in the cluster (block 204). Such adistribution may be carried out by, for example, broadcasting theinformation as part of a VIPA_list as is utilized in VIPA takeover. Inthe present example, communication protocol stacks 22 and 38 woulddistribute their information to the other communication protocol stacks22, 26, 30, 34 and 38. The routing communication protocol stacks 22 and38 also advertise their respective DVIPAs as IP addresses through therouting protocol utilized to communicate with the network 44 (block206). Alternatively, ownership of the DVIPAs for communications on thenetwork 44 may be established through the IP Assist function of QueuedDirect I/O for OSA Express adapters.

The routing communication protocol stacks also wait for messages fromthe other communication protocol stacks which identify applicationswhich are bound to their DVIPAs and listen on an identified port (block208). As the messages are received, the routing communication protocolstacks build a Destination Port Table (DPT) which identifies thosestacks having instances of applications bound to the DVIPA and listeningon an identified port (block 210). Thus, the routing communicationprotocol stacks, such as the communication protocol stacks 22 and 38,are notified of which communication protocol stacks have applicationsbound to the DVIPA and which are available to distribute connections tothe DVIPA so as to balance workload between the applications.

Initialization and operation of a server stack is described in detail inthe above described United States Patent Applications. Furthermore, inaddition to the initialization described in these United States PatentApplications, the server stack will also install the policy filters asdescribed above. Briefly, the communication protocol stack monitors theaddresses and ports associated with application instances utilizing theprotocol stack and, if an application utilizing the protocol stack isbound or binds to the DVIPA and listens on a port identified in the VIPAlist as a DVIPA port, the protocol stack sends a message to the routingcommunication protocol stack associated with the DVIPA to notify therouting communication protocol stack that communications may be routedto the application through the candidate target stack. Such candidatetarget protocol stacks which have applications bound to the DVIPA andlistening on a port associated with the DVIPA may be referred to as a“current actual target” and, as described above, are identified in theDPT of the routing communication protocol stack as available forreceiving connections.

A message may also be sent if an application instance bound to a DVIPAand listening to a port identified in the VIPA list terminates so thatthe VIPA distribution function 23 of the routing communication protocolstack may maintain an up-to-date DPT. If there are any activeconnections to the DVIPA, a connection message may be sent to therouting protocol stack to notify it of the existence of the connection.In such a manner, the routing protocol stack may incorporate theconnection in its current routing table (CRT) as described herein. Sucha connection message may allow for movement of connections betweenrouting protocol stacks, for example, to recover from a failure of arouting protocol stack.

Because the IPSec processing is performed at the routing protocol stackand not the server protocol stack, previous fragmentation avoidancemechanisms, such as those provided in OS/390 V2R8 which examined IPSecdynamic tunnels to determine IPSec header size and then reduced theMaximum Transmission Unit (MTU) size associated with the connection, forexample, in the Transmission Control Block (TCB), is typically notpossible. Thus, to avoid fragmentation, the MTU size in the TCB of theserver protocol stack is adjusted by a representative IPSec header size,rather than the actual IPSec header size, if IPSec is specified for aconnection.

FIG. 11 illustrates operations carried out by a VIPA distributionfunction 23 of a communication protocol stack upon receiving a GREencapsulated message from another communication protocol stack whichrequires IPSec processing. As seen in FIG. 11, when a protocol stackreceives a message the message is GRE decapsulated (block 220). Theprotocol stack determines if the communication was received from aphysical link corresponding to the XCF source identified in the GREheader of the message (block 222). If not, then the message isconsidered a “spoof” of the source and is discarded. If the message isreceived from the corresponding physical link (block 222), the protocolstack determines if the message is for a DVIPA (block 224). If themessage is not for a DVIPA, then normal processing of the message may beperformed. If information for a DVIPA using IPSec is present in themessage (block 222), then the VIPA distribution function 23 bypassesinbound filtering (block 226) and it is determined if the message is aninitial IPSec message for the DVIPA connection (block 228). If it is aninitial message, the CRT is updated to reflect that the connection isusing IPSec and outbound messages for the DVIPA connection are routed tothe routing communication protocol stack (block 230). In any event, themessage is provided to the appropriate service (block 232).

In the present example using the system illustrated in FIG. 9, theprotocol stack 22 of MVS1 would broadcast a VIPA list (DVIPA_list_1)identifying MVS1 as the primary routing communication protocol stack,DVA1 as a dynamic routable VIPA with port 60 as an associated port andthe communication protocol stacks 22, 26 and 34 as candidate targetcommunication protocol stacks. Additionally, the protocol stack 38 ofMVS5 would broadcast a VIPA list (DVIPA_list_2) identifying MVS1 as theprimary routing communication protocol stack, DVB1 as a dynamic routableVIPA with port 60 as an associated port and all of the communicationprotocol stacks 22, 26 30, 34 and 38 as candidate target communicationprotocol stacks. Also, the communication protocol stack 22 would beidentified as a backup to the communication protocol stack 38 and thecommunication protocol stack 38 would be identified as a backup to thecommunication protocol stack 22. The communication protocol stack 22would retain the information in the distributed VIPA list for DVB2 asthe communication protocol stack 22 does not have a VIPADISTributestatement for DVB2. However, the communication protocol stack 38 neednot retain the received VIPA list for DVA1 as it has its own, explicit,VIPADISTribute statement for DVA1.

When, for example, communication protocol stack 26 receivesDVIPA_list_1, it examines the list and determines that it is identifiedas a candidate target stack. Thus, the VIPA distribution function 23 ofcommunication protocol stack 26 adds the DVIPA DVA1 as a non-routableVIPA and determines if an application is executing which is bound toDVA1 and listening to port 60. For purposes of the present example, APPA is bound to DVA1 and listening to port 60 so the communicationprotocol stack 26 sends a SRVSTAT message to communication protocolstack 22 identifying itself as a current actual target. The VIPAdistribution function 23 of the communication protocol stack 22incorporates the XCF address of the communication protocol stack 22 intoits DPT. Messages to port 60 of the DVIPA may then be routed to thecommunication protocol stack 26. Because no connections exist at thistime, a NEWCONN message is not sent.

When the communication protocol stack 30 receives DVIPA_list_1, itexamines the list and is not identified as a candidate target stack oras a backup to the communication protocol stack 22 and may disregard thelist. When the communication protocol stack 38 receives DVIPA_list_1, itexamines the list and is not identified as a candidate target stack butis identified as a backup to the communication protocol stack 22. Thus,the communication protocol stack 38 stores the list for use in errorrecovery.

When any of the communication protocol stacks 22, 26, 30, 34 and 38receive the DVIPA_list_2 they note that the “ALL” parameter isidentified and add the DVIPA DVB1 as a non-routable VIPA. Thesecommunication protocol stacks 22, 26, 30, 34 and 38 monitor forapplications bound to DVB1 and listening on port 60 to determine if anapplication is executing which is bound to DVBL and listening to port60. If and when such an application binds to DVB1 and listens on port 60a SRVSTAT message is sent to the communication protocol stack 38 toidentify the candidate target stack as a current actual target asdescribed above. Furthermore, if a communication protocol stack issubsequently activated, it identifies DVB1 as a DVIPA and adds DVB1 as anon-routable VIPA.

Furthermore, in the present example, DVA1 has a connection establishedto APPA on MVS2 which is using IPSec. When a current actual targetcommunication protocol stack, such as protocol stack 26, receives a GREencapsulated message from routing protocol stack 22, it GRE decapsulatesthe message and determines if the message is for the IPSec connection toDVA1 by consulting its CRT. The current actual target communicationprotocol stack 26 also evaluates the physical link over which themessage was received to determine if it corresponds to the XCF addressof the routing communication protocol stack 22 which was incorporated inthe GRE header of the message. If the physical link and the XCF addresscorrespond, then the message is accepted. Otherwise, the message isrejected. Furthermore, because the message is for DVA1, IP filtering ofthe inbound message is bypassed. The message is provided to APPA.

For an outbound message, the server protocol stack operates as describedabove with reference to FIG. 6. The server protocol stack determines ifthe outbound message is to a DVIPA and, if so, the message isencapsulated with GRE and sent to the routing protocol stack for IPSecprocessing.

FIG. 12 illustrates operations of a routing communication protocol stackwhen a communication is received from the network 44. As is seen in FIG.12, the communication is IPSec processed (block 240) and inboundfiltered utilizing the IP/IPSec filters for network communications(block 241). The communication protocol stack determines if thecommunication is to a DVIPA associated with the stack (block 242) by,for example, examining the IP address and port of the communication andcomparing that with those of the DVIPAs for the protocol stack (block242). If the communication is not to a DVIPA of the protocol stack, thenoperations of the VIPA distribution function 23 may terminate withrespect to the communication.

If the communication is to a DVIPA of the protocol stack, then the VIPAdistribution function 23 determines if the communication is a SYN toestablish a connection to the DVIPA (block 244). If so, then the VIPAdistribution function 23 may select a current actual target for theconnection (i.e. a communication protocol stack with an applicationbound to the DVIPA and listening to the port specified by thecommunication)(block 2). Such a selection may, for example, be based onpredefined criteria, utilizing a predefined selection pattern, such asround-robin, weighted round-robin or the like, or may be based ondynamic criteria, policies or combinations thereof. For example, theselection may be made to distribute workload between the candidatetarget stacks. Thus, a workload manger and/or a service policy agent maybe consulted in selecting the candidate target stack.

However the selection is made, the VIPA distribution function 23 updatesa current routing table (CRT) which defines the path from the routingcommunication protocol stack to the selected current actual target(block 264). Such an update may take the form of creating an entryincorporating the source IP address, DVIPA and port and the XCF addressof the selected current actual target.

The routing communication protocol stack also determines if IPSecprocessing was performed on the message (block 256). If the connectionutilizes IPSec (block 256) the message is GRE encapsulated (block 262).In either case, the message is forwarded to the selected current actualtarget using the XCF address of the current actual target (block 266).

Returning to block 244, if the communication is not a SYN message, thenthe VIPA distribution function 23 of the routing communication protocolstack consults the CRT to route the communication (block 246). It isalso determined if the message is distributed (i.e. for a current actualtarget which is remote from the routing communication protocol stack)(block 248). If the message is not distributed (block 248), the messageis for a local target and may be provided to the associated service(block 250). If the message is distributed (block 248), then operationscontinue with block 256 as described above.

FIG. 13 illustrates operations of the VIPA distribution function 23 ofthe routing communication protocol stack when a message is received fromanother communication protocol stack. As is seen in FIG. 13, the VIPAdistribution function 23 determines if the message is a GRE encapsulatedmessage (block 270). If so, the message is GRE decapsulated (block 272).It is determined if the GRE decapsulated message is for a DVIPA (block274). If not, operations with respect to the IPSec processing mayterminate. If the message is for a DVIPA (block 274), it is determinedif the message was received from an XCF link associated with the sourceof the message (block 275). Such a determination may be made, asdescribed above, by comparing the physical link over which the messagewas received with the XCF source address in the GRE header to see if thephysical link corresponds to the XCF address. If not, the message isdiscarded.

If the message is from the proper physical link, inbound filtering forthe message is bypassed (block 276) and the GRE decapsulated message isoutbound filtered to determine if IPSec processing is needed (block277). If so, the GRE decapsulated message is IPSec processed by therouting communication protocol stack (block 278). The IPSec processedmessage is then sent on the network (block 278).

If the message is not a GRE encapsulated message (block 270), it may bedetermined if the message is a NEWCONN message (block 280). A NEWCONNmessage may be generated if an application bound to a DVIPA utilizing aport in the VIPA list initiates a connection or, as described above, ifa communication protocol stack receives a VIPA list with a DVIPA whichalready has applications using the DVIPA for connections, then the VIPAdistribution function 23 of the communication protocol stack sends aNEWCONN message to the routing communication protocol stack to notifythe routing communication protocol stack of the connection. If themessage is a NEWCONN message (block 280), the VIPA distribution function23 determines if the connection is to utilize IPSec (block 284). If not,the VIPA distribution function 23 incorporates the connection into theCRT (block 286). Such an incorporation of the connection into the CRTmay be carried out as described above for connections originated fromnetwork 44.

If the message is a NEWCONN message associated with a connection usingIPSec, then it is determined if a new SA is required for the connection(block 288). Such a determination may be made, for example, based onwhether the NEWCONN is for a takeback of for a connection which isrequesting that an SA be negotiated. If a new SA is not needed (block288), the new connection is incorporated in the CRT as described above(block 286).

If a new SA is needed (block 288), IKE is notified and a new SA isnegotiated (block 294). The phase 1 and phase 2 SA information andinformation correlating the two is placed in the coupling facility forthe new SA (block 296). The new connection is also incorporated in theCRT as described above (block 286). Furthermore, binding information forthe connection may be included in the CRT which may allow the routingcommunication protocol stack to perform policy filter rule binding. Theuse of policy filter rule binding allows the routing communicationprotocol stack to avoid per packet filter rule search by identifying thefilter rules associated with a connection in the CRT and then usingthose filter rules for all packets of the connection.

Returning to the example illustrated in FIG. 9, when an IPSecencapsulated SYN message to port 60 of DVA1 is received from network 44by communication protocol stack 22, the VIPA distribution function 23IPSec decapsulates the SYN message and determines that the SYN is to adynamic routable VIPA for which it is the routing communication protocolstack, consults its DPT and optionally a workload management function(not shown) and selects a current actual target as a destination for themessage. In the present example, IPSec is specified for the connection.The VIPA distribution function 23 of the communication protocol stack 22may select the communication protocol stack 26 as a destination. Thecommunication protocol stack 22 creates an entry for the connection inits CRT. The SYN message is encapsulated into a GRE encapsulated messageand forwarded to the communication protocol stack 26. Subsequent IPSecencapsulated messages from the network 44 to port 60 of DVA1 from thesource IP address will also be IPSec processed, encapsulated and routedto the communication protocol stack 26 using the CRT entry.

An instance of APP A of the communication protocol stack 26 bound toDVA1 and utilizing port 60 may also establish a connection over network44 which, if utilizing IPSec, will be routed through the communicationprotocol stack 22 as the routing communication protocol stack. When suchoccurs, the VIPA distribution function 23 of communication protocolstack 26 sends a NEWCONN message to the routing communication protocolstack 22 identifying the new connection. The VIPA distribution function23 of communication protocol stack 22 receives the NEWCONN message and,if a new SA is needed for the connection, notifies IKE and negotiatesthe SAs for the connection. Information regarding the new SAs is placedin the coupling facility and the CRT is updated to reflect the new DVIPAconnection to route communications from the identified new connection toport 60 of DVA1 to the communication protocol stack 26.

FIGS. 14 and 15 illustrate operations of the VIPA distribution function23 during failure of a routing communication protocol stack havingDVIPAs using IPSec and during recovery of a routing communicationprotocol stack. As seen in FIG. 14, when a failure occurs, the othercommunication protocol stacks in the cluster of data processing systemsare notified of the failure (block 310). The communication protocolstack identified as the backup stack for the dynamic routable VIPA takesover routing functions for that DVIPA so as to become a backup routingcommunication protocol stack. In addition, the backup routingcommunication protocol stack may broadcast the DVIPA list that it willutilize in routing connections for the DVIPA (block 312). This list maybe the list provided by the primary routing communication protocol stackor a list defined explicitly for the backup routing communicationprotocol stack. Alternatively, the list may be distributed only in theinstance where the backup routing communication protocol stack has anexplicitly defined DVIPA list.

As described above, because of the broadcast of this information, eachof the communication protocol stacks is aware that it is a candidatetarget for a DVIPA and the identity of the highest ranking backuprouting communication protocol stack. Therefore, the communicationprotocol stacks with application instances bound to the DVIPA andlistening on an associated port may send a SRVSTAT message and a NEWCONNmessage(s) for connections to the DVIPA for the communication protocolstack to the backup routing communication protocol stack (block 314).The communication protocol stacks also associate the backup routingcommunication protocol stack with any connections utilizing the DVIPA sothat subsequent messages for the DVIPA are sent to the backup routingcommunication protocol stack (block 316). The backup routingcommunication protocol stack utilizes the SRVSTAT messages and itsinformation from the appropriate VIPA list to build a new DPT for theDVIPA (block 318).

The backup routing communication protocol stack also receives NEWCONNmessages from the server communication protocol stacks with existingDVIPA connections and constructs a CRT based on these messages (block320). The constructed CRT may include information on whether theconnection utilized IPSec. The routing information from the constructedCRT is incorporated into the backup routing communication protocolstack's own CRT (block 322). The backup routing communication protocolstack may also send its own DVIPA messages to the other communicationprotocol stacks to notify the other communication protocol stacks thatit is performing the backup function (block 324). Such messages may besent to prevent other backup communication protocol stacks in a list ofbackups from taking over the DVIPA. Details on the transfer of a VIPA toa backup are provided in U.S. patent application Ser. No. 09/401,419described above. Furthermore, in particular embodiments, the issuance ofthe SRVSTAT or the NEWCONN messages may be in response to the DVIPAmessages sent by the backup routing communication protocol stack. Thus,embodiments of the present invention are not limited to the sequenceillustrated in FIGS. 14 and 15.

The backup routing communication protocol stack obtains the SAinformation from the coupling facility (block 326). IKE is notified ofthe failure (block 330) and the obtained SA information is provided toIKE which then renegotiates the Phase 1 and Phase 2 SAs based on theinformation and installs the negotiated SAs in the communicationprotocol stack (block 332). The newly negotiated phase 1 SAs andcorrelation to phase 2 SAs are then placed in the coupling facility asdescribed above to provide the recovery information for the IPSec SAs(block 334). The information read from the coupling may be removed(block 336). Operations continue with the backup routing communicationprotocol stack operating as the routing communication protocol stackdescribed above.

Turning to FIG. 15, when the primary communication protocol stackrecovers, it again broadcasts its VIPA list which is received by theother communication protocol stacks (block 340). In response toreceiving the VIPA list, the candidate target stacks send SRVSTATmessages to the recovered primary routing communication protocol stack(block 342) which identify the stacks which have application instancesbound to the DVIPA and utilizing a port of the VIPA list. The recoveredprimary routing communication protocol stack also sends a DVIPA messageto the backup communication protocol stack which receives the takebackmessage (block 344) and generates a NEWCONN message for all theconnections which are routed through the backup communication protocolstack (block 346).

The backup stack also performs a delete tunnel for all SAs of the DVIPAthat is being recovered and schedules a delete DVIPA event to IKE (block348). IKE cleans up its representation of the Phase 1 associated withthe tunnel being deleted and no longer processes Phase 1 or Phase 2requests and updates to the coupling facility are rejected so that thecoupling facility entries are considered stable (block 350). Also, localconnections to the DVIPA at the backup routing communication protocolstack are marked as distributed so that they are routed through therecovering routing communication protocol stack (block 352).

The recovering routing communication protocol stack obtains the SAinformation from the coupling facility (block 354) and removes theinformation from the coupling facility after it is obtained (block 356).IKE is notified of the takeback (block 358), for example, using an EventControl Block (ECB) and the obtained SA information provided to IKEwhich renegotiates the Phase 1 and Phase 2 SAs based on the informationand installs the negotiated SAs in the communication protocol stack(block 360). The newly negotiated phase 1 SAs and correlation to phase 2SAs are then placed in the coupling facility as described above toprovide the recovery information for the IPSec SAs (block 362) and theobtained SAs may be removed from the coupling facility (block 363). Thephase 2 SAs may then be cleared from the backup routing communicationprotocol stack and a delete may be sent to the IKE partner for the Phase2 SAs that were active on the backup routing communication protocolstack prior to takeover by the primary routing communication protocolstack (block 364). To perform such a delete, the Security ParameterIndex (SPI) and the protocol for the Phase 2 SA should be included aspart of the recovery information stored in the coupling facility.Furthermore, IKE may also install filters in the communication protocolstack. In such a case, added dynamic filters that are duplicates ofactive dynamic filters may be discarded. New SAs and dynamic filtersthat can be associated with an existing dynamic filter and tunnel may beadded to the existing tunnel.

The NEWCONN message is sent to the primary routing communicationprotocol stack (block 366) and the primary routing communicationprotocol stack constructs a CRT based on the information from themessage. Alternatively, the server stacks may send NEWCONN messagesdirectly to the recovered primary routing stack either in response toreceiving the VIPA list or the DVIPA message. In any case, routing ofthe existing connections may then be performed by the primary routingcommunication protocol stack. Finally, the backup routing communicationprotocol stack deletes the DVIPA and cleans up its routing and DPTtables (block 368). Thus the routing of the DVIPA is returned to therecovered stack.

In the example illustrated in FIG. 9, assume that the communicationprotocol stacks 26 and 34 have applications with connections using IPSecrouted through the DVIPA of the routing communication protocol stack 22.Furthermore, the communication protocol stack 38 is defined as thebackup to the communication protocol stack 22. If the communicationprotocol stack 22 fails, then the communication protocol stacks 26 and34 send SRVSTAT messages to the backup routing communication protocolstack 38 identifying them as current actual targets. The communicationprotocol stacks 26 and 34 also associate the communication protocolstack 38 with the DVIPA DVA1 and send all subsequent messages to thebackup routing communication protocol stack 38. The communicationprotocol stack 38 builds its DPT from the SRVSTAT messages, receivesNEWCONN messages for connections through the failed communicationprotocol stack 22 and creates routing information for incorporating inits CRT.

The backup routing communication protocol stack 38 also obtains the SAinformation from the coupling facility and notifies its instance of IKEthrough an ECB to negotiate the SAs using the information from thecoupling facility 40. IKE negotiates the SAs and installs the SAs in thebackup routing communication protocol stack 38 which places the SAinformation into the coupling facility 40. The backup routingcommunication protocol stack 38 incorporates the routing informationinto its routing table and begins routing messages and performing IPSecprocessing for the connections previously routed through the failedcommunication protocol stack. The backup routing communication protocolstack 38 may also send a DVIPA message to the other communicationprotocol stacks 26, 30 and 34 to indicate that it is backing up theDVIPA DVA1.

When the primary routing communication protocol stack 22 is recovered,it sends a VIPA list to the other communication protocol stacks 26, 30,34 and 38. The VIPA list message signals the other communicationprotocol stacks 26, 30, 34 and 38 to send SRVSTAT messages to thecommunication protocol stack 22 so as to identify current actual targetsfor the DVIPA DVA1. The other communication protocol stacks also routesubsequent IPSec traffic through communication protocol stack 22. Thecommunication protocol stack 22 builds a DPT from the SRVSTAT messages.The backup routing communication protocol stack 38 also generates aNEWCONN message for each connection to DVA1 routed through the backuprouting communication protocol stack 38 and sends this message to thecommunication protocol stack 22. Alternatively, the server communicationstacks may send NEWCONN messages in response to the VIPA listidentifying existing connections to the DVIPA. In any case, thecommunication protocol stack 22 builds a CRT from the NEWCONNmessage(s).

The backup routing communication protocol stack 38 deletes the SAs forthe connections using IPSec and schedules a delete DVIPA event whichnotifies its instance of IKE that the SAs are no longer owned by thebackup routing communication protocol stack's 38 IKE instance and so IKEno longer negotiates SAs and updates to the coupling facility are nolonger performed. The backup routing communication protocol stack 38also cleans up its routing tables and deletes DVA1 so that it no longerperforms routing for DVA1 and identifies any local connections to DVA1as distributed so that subsequent IPSec traffic to DVA1 is routedthrough communication protocol stack 22.

The communication protocol stack 22 reads the SA information from thecoupling facility 40 and notifies its IKE instance of the takeback. IKEnegotiates new SAs based on the information from the coupling facility40 and installs the new SAs in the communication protocol stack 22 whichplaces SA information in the coupling facility 40 and clears thepreviously read information from the coupling facility 40. Thus, controlof DVA1 may be transferred back to the communication protocol stack 22with limited disruption to the connections.

In the VIPA Distributor embodiments providing failure recovery, the SAnegotiated that applies to a dynamic VIPA is preferably at a granularityno coarser than host for the local address. In other words, a dynamic SAshould not use a subnet or range the encompasses a dynamic VIPA address.This rule may ensure that, on a VIPA giveback, the SA can be moved fromhost to host without concerns about an SA being applicable to both thebackup and primary host simultaneously. If such a condition exists, theSA can be identified as not moveable within the Sysplex and, thus, not a“Sysplex Wide SA.”

Furthermore, to provide such movability of SAs, certificates identifyinghosts should be available on all hosts. Thus, Resource Access ControlFacility (RACF), the repository for IKE certificates should be shareablebetween processors in the Sysplex.

While the present invention has been described with respect to the VIPAdistribution function as a part of the communication protocol stack, aswill be appreciated by those of skill in the art, such functions may beprovided as separate functions, objects or applications which maycooperate with the communication protocol stacks. Furthermore, thepresent invention has been described with reference to particularsequences of operations. However, as will be appreciated by those ofskill in the art, other sequences may be utilized while stillbenefitting from the teachings of the present invention. Thus, while thepresent invention is described with respect to a particular division offunctions or sequences of events, such divisions or sequences are merelyillustrative of particular embodiments of the present invention and thepresent invention should not be construed as limited to suchembodiments.

Furthermore, while the present invention has been described withreference to particular embodiments of the present invention in aSystem/390 environment, as will be appreciated by those of skill in theart, the present invention may be embodied in other environments andshould not be construed as limited to System/390 but may be incorporatedinto other systems, such as a Unix or other environments, by associatingapplications or groups of applications with an address rather than acommunications adapter. Thus, the present invention may be suitable foruse in any collection of data processing systems which allow sufficientcommunication to all of the systems for the use of dynamic virtualaddressing. Accordingly, specific references to System/390 systems orfacilities, such as the “coupling facility,” “ESCON,” “Sysplex” or thelike should not be construed as limiting the present invention.

In the drawings and specification, there have been disclosed typicalpreferred embodiments of the invention and, although specific terms areemployed, they are used in a generic and descriptive sense only and notfor purposes of limitation, the scope of the invention being set forthin the following claims.

1. A method for providing secure communications over a network in adistributed workload environment having target hosts which are accessedthrough a distribution processor by a common network address, the methodcomprising the steps of: receiving at the distribution processor,network communications directed to the common network address;determining whether the network communications are secure networkcommunications; processing secure network communications by: routingboth inbound and outbound communications with target hosts which areassociated with an end-to-end secure network communication through thedistribution processor; processing both inbound and outbound end-to-endsecure network communications at the distribution processor so as toprovide endpoint network security processing of communications from thetarget host to the distribution processor and endpoint network securityprocessing of communications from the distribution processor to thetarget host such that the distribution processor serves as an endpointfor the end-to-end secure network communication; and distributing thereceived secure network communications that are directed to the commonnetwork address among selected ones of the target hosts so as todistribute workload associated with the network communications among thetarget hosts including encapsulating communications between thedistribution processor and the selected ones of the plurality of targethosts which are associated with end-to-end secure network communicationsso as to distinguish communications between the distribution processorand the selected ones of the plurality of target hosts which areassociated with secure network communications from other communications;and processing non-secure communications by distributing the receivednetwork communications that are directed to the common network addressamong the target hosts so as to distribute workload associated with thenetwork communications among the target hosts.
 2. A method according toclaim 1, further comprising the steps of: determining if the receivednetwork communications are end-to-end secure network communicationswhich are to be distributed to ones of the target hosts; whereinencapsulating communications between the distribution processor andselected ones of plurality of target hosts which are associated withend-to-end secure network communications comprises processing thereceived network communications so as to provide encapsulated genericcommunications to the ones of the plurality of target hosts if thereceived network communications are end-to-end secure networkcommunications which are distributed to ones of the target hosts and tonot provide encapsulated generic communications to the ones of theplurality of target hosts if the received network communications are notend-to-end secure network communications.
 3. A method according to claim2, wherein processing both inbound and outbound end-to-end securenetwork communications further comprises the steps of: receiving at thedistribution processor communications from the ones of the target hostswhich are associated with end-to-end secure network communications; andprocessing the received communications from the ones of the target hostsso as to provide endpoint network security for the communications fromthe ones of the target host.
 4. A method according to claim 1, whereinencapsulating communications between the distribution processor andselected ones of the plurality of target hosts which are associated withend-to-end secure network communications comprises encapsulating thecommunications in a generic routing format.
 5. A method according toclaim 4, wherein the generic communications are encapsulated in ageneric routing format having sufficient information in a header of thegeneric routing format so as to authenticate the source of thecommunication between the distribution processor and ones of theplurality of target hosts.
 6. A method according to claim 1, wherein thecommunications received from the target hosts at the distributionprocessor and the encapsulated communications to ones of the pluralityof target hosts from the distribution processor are communicated overtrusted communication links.
 7. A method according to claim 4, furthercomprising establishing common IP filters for communications at thedistribution processor and the plurality or target hosts.
 8. A methodaccording to claim 7, wherein the common IP filters bypass IP filteringfor inbound communications encapsulated in the generic routing format.9. The method according to claim 1, wherein distributing the receivednetwork communications that are directed to the common IP address amongselected ones of the target hosts comprises: selecting among the targethosts for distribution of the network communications in response to apredefined selection pattern to distribute workload associated with thenetwork communications among the target hosts.
 10. The method accordingto claim 9, wherein selecting among the target hosts for distribution ofthe network communications in response to a predefined selection patternto distribute workload associated with the network communications amongthe target hosts comprises: selecting among the target hosts associatedwith the common network address based on a round-robin pattern.
 11. Themethod according to claim 1, wherein distributing the received networkcommunications that are directed to the common network address amongselected ones of the target hosts comprises: selecting among the targethosts for distribution of the network communications in response to adynamic criteria that changes over time to distribute workloadassociated with the network communications among the target hosts. 12.The method according to claim 1, further comprising: receiving at atarget host, an encapsulated communication; comparing a physical linkcorresponding to said distributor to a source of encapsulation; andignoring the encapsulated communication if said physical link does notmatch to said source of encapsulation.
 13. The method according to claim1, wherein distributing the received network communications that aredirected to the common network address among selected ones of the targethosts distribution processor comprises distributing the received networkcommunications using a sysplex distributor.
 14. The method according toclaim 1, wherein the end-to-end secure network communication comprises acommunication using the IPSEC communication protocol.